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Abstract
Background: Security concerns have been raised since big data became a prominent tool in data analysis. For
instance, many machine learning algorithms aim to generate prediction models using training data which contain
sensitive information about individuals. Cryptography community is considering secure computation as a solution for
privacy protection. In particular, practical requirements have triggered research on the efficiency of cryptographic
primitives.
Methods: This paper presents a method to train a logistic regression model without information leakage. We apply
the homomorphic encryption scheme of Cheon et al. (ASIACRYPT 2017) for an efficient arithmetic over real numbers,
and devise a new encoding method to reduce storage of encrypted database. In addition, we adapt Nesterov’s
accelerated gradient method to reduce the number of iterations as well as the computational cost while maintaining
the quality of an output classifier.
Results: Our method shows a state-of-the-art performance of homomorphic encryption system in a real-world
application. The submission based on this work was selected as the best solution of Track 3 at iDASH privacy and
security competition 2017. For example, it took about six minutes to obtain a logistic regression model given the
dataset consisting of 1579 samples, each of which has 18 features with a binary outcome variable.
Conclusions: We present a practical solution for outsourcing analysis tools such as logistic regression analysis while
preserving the data confidentiality.
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Background
Machine learning (ML) is a class of methods in arti-
ficial intelligence, the characteristic feature of which is
that they do not give the solution of a particular prob-
lem but they learn the process of finding solutions to a
set of similar problems. The theory of ML appeared in
the early 60’s on the basis of the achievements of cyber-
netics [1] and gave the impetus to the development of
theory and practice of technically complex learning sys-
tems [2]. The goal of ML is to partially or fully automate
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the solution of complicated tasks in various fields of
human activity.
The scope of ML applications is constantly expanding;
however, with the rise of ML, the security problem has
become an important issue. For example, many medical
decisions rely on logistic regression model, and biomed-
ical data usually contain confidential information about
individuals [3] which should be treated carefully. There-
fore, privacy and security of data are the major concerns,
especially when deploying the outsource analysis tools.
There have been several researches on secure computa-
tion based on cryptographic primitives. Nikolaenko et al.
[4] presented a privacy preserving linear regression pro-
tocol on horizontally partitioned data using Yao’s gar-
bled circuits [5]. Multi-party computation technique was
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also applied to privacy-preserving logistic regression
[6–8]. However, this approach is vulnerable when a party
behaves dishonestly, and the assumption for secret sharing
is quite different from that of outsourcing computation.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a cryptosystem that
allows us to perform certain arithmetic operations on
encrypted data and receive an encrypted result that corre-
sponds to the result of operations performed in plaintext.
Several papers already discussed ML with HE techniques.
Wu et al. [9] used Paillier cryptosystem [10] and approx-
imated the logistic function using polynomials, but it
required an exponentially growing computational cost in
the degree of the approximation polynomial. Aono et al.
[11] and Xie et al. [12] used an additive HE scheme
to aggregate some intermediate statistics. However, the
scenario of Aono et al. relies on the client to decrypt
these intermediary statistics and the method of Xie et al.
requires expensive computational cost to calculate the
intermediate information. The most related research of
this paper is the work of Kim et al. [13] which also used HE
based ML. However, the size of encrypted data and learn-
ing time were highly dependent on the number of features,
so the performance for a large dataset was not practical in
terms of storage and computational cost.
Since 2011, the iDASH Privacy and Security Workshop
has assembled specialists in privacy technology to discuss
issues that apply to biomedical data sharing, as well as
main stakeholders who provided an overview of the main
uses of the data, different laws and regulations, and their
own views on privacy. In addition, it has began to hold
annual competitions on the basis of the workshop from
2014. The goal of this challenge is to evaluate the per-
formance of state-of-the-arts methods that ensures rig-
orous data confidentiality during data analysis in a cloud
environment.
In this paper, we provide a solution to the third track
of iDASH 2017 competition, which aims to develop HE
based secure solutions for building a ML model (i.e., logis-
tic regression) on encrypted data. We propose a general
practical solution for HE based ML that demonstrates
good performance and low storage costs. In practice,
our output quality is comparable to the one of an unen-
crypted learning case. As a basis, we use the HE scheme
for approximate arithmetic [14]. To improve the perfor-
mance, we apply several additional techniques including
a packing method, which reduce the required storage
space and optimize the computational time. We also adapt
Nesterov’s accelerated gradient [15] to increase the speed
of convergence. As a result, we could obtain a high-
accuracy classifier using only a small number of iterations.
We give an open-source implementation [16] to demon-
strate the performance of our HE based ML method. With
our packing method we can encrypt the dataset with 1579
samples and 18 features using 39MB of memory. The
encrypted learning time is about six minutes. We also
demonstrate our implementation on the datasets used in
[13] to compare the results. For example, the training of
a logistic regression model took about 3.6 min with the
storage about 0.02GB compared to 114 min and 0.69GB
of Kim et al. [13] when a dataset consists of 1253 samples,
each of which has 9 features.
Methods
Logistic regression
Logistic regression or logit model is a ML model used
to predict the probability of occurrence of an event by
fitting data to a logistic curve [17]. It is widely used in var-
ious fields including machine learning, biomedicine [18],
genetics [19], and social sciences [20].
Throughout this paper, we treat the case of a binary
dependent variable, represented by ± 1. Learning data
consists of pairs (xi, yi) of a vector of co-variates xi =
(xi1, ..., xif ) ∈ Rf and a dependent variable yi ∈ {±1}.
Logistic regression aims to find an optimal β ∈ Rf +1







1 + exp(−yi(1, xi)Tβ) ,












where zi = yi · (1, xi) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Gradient descent
Gradient Descent (GD) is a method for finding a local
extremum (minimum or maximum) of a function by mov-
ing along gradients. To minimize the function in the
direction of the gradient, one-dimensional optimization
methods are used.
For logistic regression, the gradient of the cost function
with respect to β is computed by









where σ(x) = 11+exp(−x) . Starting from an initial β0,
the gradient descent method at each step t updates the
regression parameters using the equation









where αt is a learning rate at step t.
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Nesterov’s accelerated gradient
The method of GD can face a problem of zig-zagging
along a local optima and this behavior of the method
becomes typical if it increases the number of variables of
an objective function. Many GD optimization algorithms
are widely used to overcome this phenomenon. Momen-
tum method, for example, dampens oscillation using the
accumulated exponential moving average for the gradient
of the loss function.
Nesterov’s accelerated gradient [15] is a slightly different
variant of the momentum update. It uses moving average
on the update vector and evaluates the gradient at this





(vs. O(1/t) of standard GD algorithm)
after t steps theoretically, and consistently works slightly
better in practice. Starting with a random initial v0 = β0,
the updated equations for Nesterov’s Accelerated GD are
as follows:
{





v(t+1) = (1 − γt) · β(t+1) + γt · β(t), (1)
where 0 < γt < 1 is a moving average smoothing
parameter.
Approximate homomorphic encryption
HE is a cryptographic scheme that allows us to carry out
operations on encrypted data without decryption. Cheon
et al. [14] presented a method to construct a HE scheme
for arithmetic of approximate numbers (called HEAAN in
what follows). The main idea is to treat an encryption
noise as part of error occurring during approximate com-
putations. That is, an encryption ct of message m ∈ R
by a secret key sk for a ciphertext modulus q will have a
decryption structure of the form 〈ct, sk〉 = m+e (mod q)
for some small e.
The following is a simple description of HEAAN based on
the ring learning with errors problem. For a power-of-two
integer N, the cyclotomic polynomial ring of dimension N
is denoted by R = Z/ (XN + 1). For a positive integer ,
we denote R = R/2R = Z2 [X] /
(
XN + 1) the residue
ring of R modulo 2.
• KeyGen (1λ).
- For an integer L that corresponds to the
largest ciphertext modulus level, given the
security parameter λ, output the ring
dimension N which is a power of two.
- Set the small distributions χkey , χerr , χenc over
R for secret, error, and encryption,
respectively.
- Sample a secret s ← χkey , a random a ← RL
and an error e ← χerr . Set the secret key as
sk ← (1, s) and the public key as
pk ← (b, a) ∈ R2L where
b ← −as + e (mod 2L).
• KSGensk(s′). For s′ ∈ R, sample a random a′ ← R2·L
and an error e′ ← χerr . Output the switching key as




- Set the evaluation key as evk ← KSGensk(s2).
• Encpk(m). For m ∈ R, sample v ← χenc and





• Decsk(ct). For ct = (c0, c1) ∈ R2 , output





• Add(ct1, ct2). For ct1, ct2 ∈ R2 , output





• CMultevk(ct; c). For ct ∈ R2 and a ∈ R, output
ct′ ← c · ct (mod 2).
• Multevk(ct1, ct2). For
ct1 = (b1, a1), ct2 = (b2, a2) ∈ R2 , let
(d0, d1, d2) = (b1b2, a1b2 + a2b1, a1a2) (mod 2).
Output
ctmult ← (d0, d1) +
⌊





• ReScale(ct; p). For a ciphertext ct ∈ R2 and an
integer p, output ct′ ← 	2−p · ct
 (mod 2−p).
For a power-of-two integer k ≤ N/2, HEAAN pro-
vides a technique to pack k complex numbers in a sin-
gle polynomial using a variant of the complex canonical
embedding map φ : Ck → R. We restrict the plaintext
space as a vector of real numbers throughout this paper.
Moreover, we multiply a scale factor of 2p to plain-
texts before the rounding operation to maintain their
precision.
• Encode(w; p). For w ∈ Rk , output the polynomial
m ← φ(2p · w) ∈ R.
• Decode(m; p). For a plaintext m ∈ R, the encoding
of an array consisting of a power of two k ≤ N/2
messages, output the vector w ← φ−1(m/2p) ∈ Rk .
The encoding/decoding techniques support the parallel
computation over encryption, yielding a better amortized
timing. In addition, the HEAAN scheme provides the rota-
tion operation on plaintext slots, i.e., it enables us to
securely obtain an encryption of the shifted plaintext
vector (wr , . . . , wk−1, w0, . . . , wr−1) from an encryption of
(w0, . . . , wk−1). It is necessary to generate an additional
public information rk, called the rotation key. We denote
the rotation operation as follows.
• Rotaterk(ct; r). For the rotation keys rk, output a
ciphertext ct′ encrypting the rotated plaintext vector
of ct by r positions.
Refer [14] for the technical details and noise analysis.
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Database encoding
For an efficient computation, it is crucial to find a good
encoding method for the given database. The HEAAN
scheme supports the encryption of a plaintext vector and
the slot-wise operations over encryption. However, our
learning data is represented by a matrix (zij)1≤i≤n,0≤j≤f . A
recent work [13] used the column-wise approach, i.e., a
vector of specific feature data (zij)1≤i≤n is encrypted in
a single ciphertext. Consequently, this method required
(f +1) number of ciphertexts to encrypt the whole dataset.
In this subsection, we suggest a more efficient encoding
method to encrypt a matrix in a single ciphertext. A train-
ing dataset consists of n samples zi ∈ Rf +1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,




z10 z11 · · · z1f





zn0 zn1 · · · znf
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
For simplicity, we assume that n and (f + 1) are
power-of-two integers satisfying log n + log(f + 1) ≤
log(N/2). Then we can pack the whole matrix in a sin-
gle ciphertext in a row-by-row manner. Specifically, we
will identify this matrix with the k-dimensional vector by
(zij)1≤i≤n,0≤j≤f → w = (w)0≤<n·(f +1) where w = zij
such that  = (f + 1)(i − 1) + j, that is,
Z → w = (z10, . . . , z1f , z20, . . . , z2f , . . . , zn0, . . . , znf ).
In a general case, we can pad zeros to set the number of
samples and the dimension of a weight vector as powers
of two.
It is necessary to perform shifting operations of row
and column vectors for the evaluation of the GD algo-
rithm. In the rest of this subsection, we explain how to
perform these operations using the rotation algorithm
provided in the HEAAN scheme. As described above, the
algorithm Rotate(ct; r) can shift the encrypted vector by
r positions. In particular, this operation is useful in our
implementation when r = f + 1 or r = 1. For the first










zn0 zn1 · · · znf
z10 z11 · · · z1f
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,




z11 · · · z1f z20





zn1 · · · znf z10
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
over encryption. The matrix Z′ is obtained from Z by
shifting its row vectors and Z′′ can be viewed as an
incomplete column shifting because of its last column.
Polynomial approximation of the sigmoid function
One limitation of the existing HE cryptosystems is that
they only support polynomial arithmetic operations. The
evaluation of the sigmoid function is an obstacle for the
implementation of the logistic regression since it cannot
be expressed as a polynomial.
Kim et al. [13] used the least squares approach to find
a global polynomial approximation of the sigmoid func-
tion. We adapt this approximation method and consider
the degree 3, 5, and 7 least squares polynomials of the
sigmoid function over the domain [ −8, 8]. We observed
that the inner product values zTi β
(t) in our experimenta-
tions belong to this interval. For simplicity, a least squares













∣∣∣ ≤ 8. The





g3(x) = 0.5 − 1.20096 · (x/8) + 0.81562 · (x/8)3,
g5(x) = 0.5 − 1.53048 · (x/8) + 2.3533056 · (x/8)3
−1.3511295 · (x/8)5,
g7(x) = 0.5 − 1.73496 · (x/8) + 4.19407 · (x/8)3
−5.43402 · (x/8)5 + 2.50739 · (x/8)7.
A low-degree polynomial requires a smaller evaluation
depth while a high-degree polynomial has a better preci-
sion. The maximum errors between σ(−x) and the least
squares g3(x), g5(x), and g7(x) are approximately 0.114,
0.061 and 0.032, respectively.
Homomorphic evaluation of the gradient descent
This section explains how to securely train the logistic
regression model using the HEAAN scheme. To be precise,
we explicitly describe a full pipeline of the evaluation of
the GD algorithm. We adapt the same assumptions as in
the previous section so that the whole database can be
encrypted in a single ciphertext.
First of all, a client encrypts the dataset and the initial
(random) weight vector β(0) and sends them to the pub-
lic cloud. The dataset is encoded to a matrix Z of size
n × (f + 1) and the weight vector is copied n times to fill
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the plaintext slots. The plaintext matrices of the resulting




z10 z11 · · · z1f

































As mentioned before, both Z and β(0) are scaled by a fac-
tor of 2p before encryption to maintain the precision of
plaintexts. We skip to mention the scaling factor in the
rest of this section since every step will return a ciphertext
with the scaling factor of 2p.
The public server takes two ciphertexts ctz and ct(t)β and
evaluates the GD algorithm to find an optimal modeling
vector. The goal of each iteration is to update the modeling
vector β(t) using the gradient of loss function:









where αt denotes the learning rate at the t-th iteration.
Each iteration consists of the following eight steps.
Step 1: For given two ciphertexts ctz and ct(t)β , compute















z10 · β(t)0 z11 · β(t)1 · · · z1f · β(t)f









Step 2: To obtain the inner product zTi β
(t), the pub-
lic cloud aggregates the values of zijβ(t)j in the same row.
This step can be done by adapting the incomplete column
shifting operation.
One simple way is to repeat this operation (f + 1)
times, but the computational cost can be reduced down to








for j = 0, 1, . . . , log(f + 1)− 1. Then the output ciphertext
ct2 encrypts the inner product values zTi β
(t) in the first























Step 3: This step performs a constant multiplication
in order to annihilate the garbage values. It can be
obtained by computing the encoding polynomial c ←




1 0 · · · 0





1 0 · · · 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
using the scaling factor of 2pc for some integer pc. The
parameter pc is chosen as the bit precision of plaintexts so
it can be smaller than the parameter p.
Finally we multiply the polynomial c to the ciphertext
ct2 and rescale it by pc bits:
ct3 ← ReScale(CMult(ct2; c); pc).
The garbage values are multiplied with zero while one can
maintain the inner products in the plaintext slots. Hence
the output ciphertext ct3 encrypts the inner product val-





(t) 0 · · · 0
zT2 β





zTn β(t) 0 · · · 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Step 4: The goal of this step is to replicate the inner
product values to other columns. Similar to Step 2, it
can be done by adding the input ciphertext to its column







for j = 0, 1, . . . , log(f + 1) − 1. The output ciphertext ct4






(t) · · · zT1 β(t)
zT2 β
(t) zT2 β





zTn β(t) zTn β(t) · · · zTn β(t)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Step 5: This step simply evaluates an approximating
polynomial of the sigmoid function, i.e., ct5 ← g(ct4) for






in its plaintext slots:






































Step 6: The public cloud multiplies the ciphertext ct5
with the encrypted dataset ctz and rescales the resulting
ciphertext by p bits:
ct6 ← ReScale(Mult(ct5, ctz); p).





















































compute the gradient of the loss function. It is obtained by























































Step 8: For the learning rate αt , it uses the parameter pc
to compute the scaled learning rate (t) = 	2pc · αt
. The















































Homomorphic evaluation of Nesterov’s accelerated
gradient
The performance of leveled HE schemes highly depends
on the depth of a circuit to be evaluated. The bottleneck of
homomorphic evaluation of the GD algorithm is that we
need to repeat the update of weight vector β(t) iteratively.
Consequently, the total depth grows linearly on the num-
ber of iterations and it should be minimized for practical
implementation.
For the homomorphic evaluation of Nesterov’s acceler-
ated gradient, a clients sends one more ciphertext ct(0)v
encrypting the initial vector v(0) to the public cloud. Then
the server uses an encryption ctz of dataset Z to update
two ciphertexts v(t) and ct(t)β at each iteration. One can
securely compute β(t+1) in the same way as the previous
section. Nesterov’s accelerated gradient requires one more
step to compute the second equation of (1) and obtain an
encryption of v(t+1) from ct(t)β and ct
(t+1)
β .
Step 9: Let (t)1 = 	2pc · γt
 and let (t)2 = 2pc − (t)1 . It



















1 · · · v(t+1)f
v(t+1)0 v
(t+1)











which encrypts v(t+1)j = (1 − γt) · β(t+1)j + γt · β(t)j in the
plaintext slots.
Results
In this section, we present parameter sets with experimen-
tal results. Our implementation is based on the HEAAN
library [21] that implements the approximate HE scheme
of Cheon et al. [14]. The source code is publicly available
at github [16].
Parameters settings
We explain how to choose the parameter sets for the
homomorphic evaluation of the (Nesterov’s) GD algo-
rithm with security analysis. We start with the parameter
L - the bitsize of a fresh ciphertext modulus. The modulus
of a ciphertext is reduced after the ReScale operations
and the evaluation of an approximate polynomial g(x).
The ReScale procedures after homomorphic multi-
plications (step 1 and 6) reduce the ciphertext modulus
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by p bits while the ReScale procedures after constant
multiplications (step 3 and 8) require pc bits of modulus
reduction. Note that the ciphertext modulus remains the
same for the step 9 for the Nesterov’s accelerated gradient
if we compute step 8 and 9 together using some precom-
puted constants. We use a similar method with a previous
work for the evaluation of the sigmoid function (see [13]
for details); the ciphertext modulus is reduced by (2p + 3)
bits for the evaluation of g3(x), and (3p+3) bits for that of
g5(x) and g7(x). Therefore, we obtain the following lower
bound on the parameter L:
L =
{
ITERNUM · (3p + 2pc + 3) + L0 g = g3,
ITERNUM · (4p + 2pc + 3) + L0 g ∈ {g5, g7},
where ITERNUM is the number of iterations of the GD
algorithm and L0 denotes the bit size of the output cipher-
text modulus. The modulus of the output ciphertext
should be larger than 2p in order to encrypt the resulting
weight vector and maintain its precision. We take p = 30,
pc = 20 and L0 = 35 in our implementation.
The dimension of a cyclotomic ring R is chosen as
N = 216 following the security estimator of Albrecht et al.
[22] for the learning with errors problem. In this case, the
bit size L of a fresh ciphertext modulus should be bounded
by 1284 to ensure the security level λ = 80 against known
attacks. Hence we repeat ITERNUM = 9 iterations of GD
algorithm g = g3, and ITERNUM = 7 iterations when
g = g5 or g = g7.
The smoothing parameter γt is chosen in accordance
with [15]. The choice of proper GD learning rate parame-
ter αt normally depends on the problem at hand. Choos-
ing too small αt leads to a slow convergence, and choosing
too large αt could lead to a divergence, or a fluctuation
near a local optima. It is often optimized by a trial and
error method, which we are not available to perform.
Under these conditions harmonic progression seems to be
a good candidate and we choose a learning rate αt = 10t+1
in our implementation.
Implementation
All the experimentations were performed on a machine
with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 v4 at 2.10 GHz processor.
Task for the iDASH challenge. In genomic data pri-
vacy and security protection competition 2017, the goal of
Track 3 was to devise a weight vector to predict the dis-
ease using the genotype and phenotype data (Additional
file 1: iDASH). This dataset consists of 1579 samples, each
of which has 18 features and a cohort information (disease
vs. healthy). Since we use the ring dimension N = 216, we
can only pack up to N/2 = 215 dataset values in a sin-
gle ciphertext but we have totally 1579 × 19 > 215 values
to be packed. We can overcome this issue by dividing the
dataset into two parts of sizes 1579 × 16 and 1579 × 3
and encoding them separately into two ciphertexts. In
general, this method can be applied to the datasets with
any number of features: the dataset can be encrypted into
(f + 1) · n · (N/2)−1
 ciphertexts.
In order to estimate the validity of our method, we
utilized 10-fold cross-validation (CV) technique: it ran-
domly partitions the dataset into ten folds with approx-
imately equal sizes, and uses every subset of 9 folds for
training and the rest one for testing the model. The per-
formance of our solution including the average running
time per fold of 10-fold CV (encryption and evaluation)
and the storage (encrypted dataset) are shown in Table 1.
This table also provides the average accuracy and the
AUC (Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic
Curve) which estimate the quality of a binary classifier.
Comparison We present some experimental results to
compare the performance of implementation to [13]. For
a fair comparison, we use the same 5-fold CV technique
on five datasets - the Myocardial Infarction dataset
from Edinburgh [23] (Additional file 2: Edinburgh), Low
Birth Weight Study (Additional file 3: lbw), Nhanes III
(Additional file 4: nhanes3), Prostate Cancer Study
(Additional file 5: pcs), and Umaru Impact Study datasets
(Additional file 6: uis) [24–27]. All datasets have a single
binary outcome variable.
All the experimental results are summarized in Table 2.
Our new packing method could reduce the storage of
ciphertexts and the use of Nesterov’s accelerated gradi-
ent achieves much higher speed than the approach of [13].
For example, it took 3.6 min to train a logistic regression
model using the encrypted Edinburgh dataset of size 0.02
GB, compared to 114 min and 0.69 GB of the previous
work [13], while achieving the good qualities of the output
models.
Discussion
The rapid growth of computing power initiated the study
of more complicated ML algorithms in various fields




Storage Accuracy AUCnum num num time time
1579 18 3 9 4s 7.94 min 0.04 GB 61.72% 0.677
5 7 4s 6.07 min 0.04 GB 62.87% 0.689
7 7 4s 7.01 min 0.04 GB 62.36% 0.689
Kim et al. BMC Medical Genomics 2018, 11(Suppl 4):83 Page 30 of 55





Storage Accuracy AUCnum num num time time
Edinburgh 1253 9 Ours 5 7 2s 3.6 min 0.02 GB 91.04% 0.958
[13] 3 25 12s 114 min 0.69 GB 86.03% 0.956
[13] 7 20 12s 114 min 0.71 GB 86.19% 0.954
lbw 189 9 Ours 5 7 2s 3.3 min 0.02 GB 69.19% 0.689
[13] 3 25 11s 99 min 0.67 GB 69.30% 0.665
[13] 7 20 11s 86 min 0.70 GB 69.29% 0.678
nhanes3 15649 15 Ours 5 7 14s 7.3 min 0.16 GB 79.22% 0.717
[13] 3 25 21s 235 min 1.15 GB 79.23% 0.732
[13] 7 20 21s 208 min 1.17 GB 79.23% 0.737
pcs 379 9 Ours 5 7 2s 3.5 min 0.02 GB 68.27% 0.740
[13] 3 25 11s 103 min 0.68 GB 68.85% 0.742
[13] 7 20 11s 97 min 0.70 GB 69.12% 0.750
uis 575 8 Ours 5 7 2s 3.5 min 0.02 GB 74.44% 0.603
[13] 3 25 10s 104 min 0.61 GB 74.43% 0.585
[13] 7 20 10s 96 min 0.63 GB 75.43% 0.617
including biomedical data analysis [28, 29]. HE system is
a promising solution for the privacy issue, but its effi-
ciency in real applications remains as an open question. It
would be great if we could extend this work to other ML
algorithms such as deep learning.
One constraint in our approach is that the number of
iterations of GD algorithm is limited depending on the
choice of HE parameter. In terms of asymptotic complex-
ity, applying the bootstrapping method of approximate HE
scheme [30] to the GD algorithm would achieve a linear
computation cost on the iteration number.
Conclusion
In the paper, we presented a solution to homomorphically
evaluate the learning phase of logistic regression model
using the gradient descent algorithm and the approximate
HE scheme. Our solution demonstrates a good perfor-
mance and the quality of learning is comparable to the
one of an unencrypted case. Our encoding method can be
easily extended to a large-scale dataset, which shows the
practical potential of our approach.
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